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COMMENTS
SECTIONS 2-725 AND 2-318, OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-THEIR
IMPLICATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to explain the function of, and
resulting problems caused by, sections 2-725' (statute of limitation in
contracts for sale) and 2-3182 (third party beneficiaries of warranties),
of the Uniform Commercial Code, South Carolina version. Section 2-
725 as drafted in South Carolina is unique.3 The consequence of this
uniqueness is that actions sounding in contract or implied warranty,
and even actions whose characteristics are more similar to tort, can be
brought under the code provisions for an indefinite period of time.' The
significance of this multi-suited statute becomes more meaningful when
the distinction between contract and tort actions are considered.
In the typical contract action the parties to the contract have
initially agreed to engage in some transaction as between themselves; in
a tort action however, the parties have normally not consented to any
dealings between themselves.- Moreover, the rights and duties flowing
from a contract are expected and accepted by the parties to the
contract, but the rights and duties in a tort action are normally
imposed by law without regard to any notion of consent.6 Comparing
this with the hybrid nature of implied warranty, we find at the onset a
buyer and seller who have agreed to contract, and who know that some
rights and duties will attach to their conduct. As between the parties to
the contract, implied warranty developed as a cause of action; liability
being based on tort law. 7 Thereafter, implied warranty came to be part
1. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-725 (Supp. 1966).
2. Id. § 10.2-318.
3. See I U.L.A.-U.C.C. § 2-725 for a summary of the various changes in this
section made by the individual states adopting the U.C.C.
4. This point will be illustrated in the text following.
5. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 634 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 651.
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of the contract for sale, but liability on the seller's part is imposed by
law and is not due to any idea of assent. 8 Tort actions can further be
characterised as a legal effort to restore an aggrieved party, as best as is
possible, to his original position before the occurrence of the event that
gave rise to the action; 9 contract actions however, seek to recompense
the aggrieved party by fulfilling his expectation of performance as
defined and contemplated in the original contract between the parties.
An even more fundamental difference between contract and tort
actions can be discovered by looking to the interests that the two fields
of law seek to protect. Tort law is designed to protect the injured
party's interest in his personal safety and property;"0 contract law
endeavors to safeguard the interests of each party by insuring that the
promises bargained for will be performed." It is therefore, not
surprising to find courts using different rules and standards in the
several types of actions. Privity, as a prerequisite in a general contract
action, is logically comprehensible due to the consensual nature of the
agreement between the contracting parties, but, privity, as a
requirement in an implied warranty action, has no place in th-It liability
is not predicated upon consent. Tort actions, not being consensual in
nature, are not easily adaptable to contract rules, and that problems,
both practical and theoretical, will arise when such adaptation is
attempted, should not be unexpected.
SECTION 2-725
The uniform version of section 2-72512 appears in part as follows:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accured. By the original agreement he parties may reduce the
period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend
it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
8. Id.
9. R. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935).
10. PROSSER, at 634.
11. Id.
12. I U.L.A.-U.C.C. § 2-725.
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performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
3
As can be seen above, the uniform section gives a four year period
reducible to one year. Also, the cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs whether or not the other party to the contract is aware of the
breach. It is to be noticed that the breach dates from tender of delivery
unless the warranty explicitly looks to future performance. Thus, with
the exception of explicit future warranties, the uniform section does not
attempt to adapt the contract limitations period to a tort type period
that would commence upon discovery of the breach, for example, an
injury.
South Carolina's version of section 2-72511 is a radical departure
from the uniform version. Section 2-725, in part, reads as follows:
(I) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) A cause of action accrues for breach of warranty when the
breach is or should have been discovered.' 5
A comparison of South Carolina's version with the uniform provision
accentuates the numerous differences. The South Carolina section does
not allow the parties to reduce the period of limitations under any
circumstances; this is consistent with pre-code statutory law in South
Carolina." Moreover, the length of the limitations period is six years in
South Carolina 7 as compared to four in the uniform section, and a
cause of action for breach of warranty accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered, apparently in all cases whether the
warranties are present or prospective. The effects of these departures
from the uniform version will be discussed below.
SECTION 2-318
As section 2-725 relates to a contract for sale, its outer scope must
be considered in light of section 2-318 s (third party beneficiaries of
13. Id. subsections (3) and (4) are omitted.
14. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-725 (Supp. 1966).
15. Id. The South Carolina Comments to this section were written before the
existing changes were made; thus, the comments are of no assistance in interpretation.
16. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10-166 (1962), provides that any effort to reduce the
limitations period in any contract for the sale of goods is wholly without effect for that
purpose.
17. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10-143 (1962), which provides a six year limitations period.
18. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 23
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warranties). Again, South Carolina's version varies from the uniform
provision,19 and provides that:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
natural person who may be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and whose person or property is damaged by
breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.?
Thus, the scope of section 2-318, and therefore the scope of section 2-
725, is extensive, but it is to be remembered that section 2-31621 could
well operate so as to destroy the effectiveness of section 2-318.22
Section 2-316 allows a seller to effectively exclude all warranties,
not only against the buyer, but as against innocent third party
beneficiaries under section 2-318 as well. This allowance of waiver or
exclusion does not seem to be a desirable result if only negligence
actions remain to vindicate those third party claims. An implied
warranty action in favor of the injured party is imposed by law as a
policy matter; its existence, as discussed before, is not premised on the
idea of consent. Thus, to allow an expressed policy to be so easily
circumvented, does not appear consistent with the purpose and policy
expressed by section 2-318. The efficacy of a negligence action against a
wholesaler or retailer may be negligible, because these persons may not
19. 1 U.L.A.-U.C.C. § 2-318 provides for three alternatives. South Carolina
adopted alternative B which was modified to the extent that its effects seem more akin to
alternative C.
20. South Carolina's version is unique in its wording. See I U.L.A.-U.C.C. § 2-
318 for other state variations.
21. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-316 (Supp. 1966) provides in part:
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied
warranties are excluded by specific language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he
desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no
implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or, between
merchants, by usage of trade.
22. See Id. § 10.2-3 18, Official Comment 1.
1971]
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be guilty of any culpable act.?3 What then, is the result where the
manufacturer is not within the jurisdiction nor can be forced within it
by use of a "long-arm" statute? It is noted that South Carolina does
have a "long-arm" statute;24 this provision is curiously found in the
uniform commercial code section and is entitled "Further Remedies."
As the provision applies to jurisdiction in general, and not solely to the
Uniform Commercial Code, it is hoped that the 1972 codification will
relocate the statute to a more appropriate title. Aside from the matter
of determining the full reach of the "long-arm" statute, there would
still be cases where the manufacturer, for one reason or another, cannot
be forced within jurisdiction of the state. For example, if the
manufacturer operated through mail orders and had no property within
the state, then obtaining jurisdiction would be very difficult without the
manufacturer's voluntary appearance.
Assuming there is no effective elimination of warranties, sections
2-725 and 2-318 may interact in such fashion as to allow actions to be
brought under their provisions which are tort, as well as contract and
warranty, in nature. To illustrate the above point, assume that a simple
purchase of an automobile is transacted by purchaser, P. Assume
further, that P's new car has defective brakes upon delivery. If a
subsequent collision, due to the bad brakes, causes injury to P and his
guest, G, then actions in favor of P and G against the seller and/or
manufacturer would lie in negligence 2 and warranty. If we now include
bystander, B, who is also injured, it seems that section 2-318 can
accommodate B's seemingly negligence action against the seller and
manufacturer on the theory of breach of implied warranty. B is a
person, under section 2-318, who may be expected to be affected by an
automobile with defective brakes.
In South Carolina, B's warranty action will be further assisted by
23. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1117 (1960).
24. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 et seq. (Supp. 1966); see Research Corp. v.
Textured Fibers, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491 (D.S.C. 1970) holding that the including of
South Carolina's long arm statute in the U.C.C. does not violate the South Carolina
Constitution, art. 3, § 17 which provides that every act having force of law shall relate to
but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.
25. See, supra note 21.
26. See, e.g., Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1960), which
adopted MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
[Vol. 23
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another change from the uniform act in section 2-607.27 South
Carolina's version of this section does not require the injured party to
notify the seller in case of personal injury arising from a sale of
consumer goods. Using another illustration, and assuming the
automobile above had defective steering when sold, but that the defect
was not discoverable by due care and maintenance, we can observe a
situation in which the seller or manufacturer can be sued for breach of
warranty, five, ten or even fifteen years after the initial sale. As the
statute of limitation does not commence until the defect is or should
have been discovered, the steering defect which caused the accident
might not be discovered until a subsequent accident some years after
the sale. The plaintiff, from the time of such accident, would have six
years in which to commence his action against the seller, and/or,
manufacturer. Some might say that it would be all but impossible to
convince a jury that a car possessed a latent defect, undiscoverable for
ten years by due care and maintenance, but those who are in doubt
should consider the following case.
In Mickle v. Blackmon,2' an accident occurring in 1962 resulted in
the plaintiff being impaled on the gearshift level of a 1949 Ford
automobile, thereby causing plaintiff to be paralyzed from the breast
downwards. The cause of action against Ford Motor Company alleged
negligence in the design and composition of the gearshift lever as well as
the ball attached to the lever for purposes of shifting. The jury found
Ford negligent, awarded $312,000 actual damages, and the trial court
granted Ford's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict from
which plaintiff appealed. The state supreme court adopted, as a
statement of law, a passage in PROSSER ON TORTS 2 which reads as
follows:
If the chattel is in good condition when it is sold, the seller is
not responsible when it undergoes subsequent changes, or wears
out. The mere lapse of time since the sale by the defendant, during
which there has been continued safe use of the product, is always
27. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-607 (Supp. 1966) provides in part:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) The buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; however, no
notice of injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
shall be required; and. . ..
28. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
29. PROSSER, at 667.
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relevant, as indicating that the seller was not responsible for the
defect . ... It is, however, quite certain that neither long
continued lapse of time nor changes in ownership will be sufficient
in themselves to defeat recovery when there is clear evidence of an
original defect in the thing sold. 1
Later in the Mickle opinion, the court noted that a lapse of thirteen
years between the sale and injury is a "formidable obstacle to fastening
liability upon the manufacturer. However, it may reasonably be
inferred in this case that the advanced age of the ball was coincidental
with its failure rather than the cause of it .... "3 The court then ruled
that it was error to grant the judgment non obstante veredicto, but
allowed Ford a new trial due to error in instructing the jury. It should
be noted that if a case similar to Mickle arose today, it could be
maintained under the provisions of sections 2-725 and 2-318.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
As discussed above, South Carolina's variations in sections 2-725
and 2-318 will allow tort type actions under the warranty provisions.
What problems will be encountered with these deviations will now be
considered. Procedural problems, that are likely to have grave effects
on substantive results, are bound to occur. For example, certain rules
of evidence, such as res ipsa loquitur or its equivalent,32 are applicable
to negligence actions;13 indeed, they may allow a plaintiff to prevail in
many products liability cases where he would otherwise not reach the
jury.3 ' In theory at least, res ipsa loquitur, as a doctrine, is not
applicable to general contract actions, nor warranty actions, but a
realistic approach would offer good reason to believe that the doctrine
will be utilized in warranty actions.- When a given court attempts to
determine the rules applicable to a particular case, such rules normally
are considered in light of the nature of that case, either contract or tort.
It would appear that in a tort type warranty action, a court must, of
30. 252 S.C. at 237, 166 S.E.2d at 189 [Emphasis added by court].
31. Id. at 240, 166 S.E.2d at 190; for other cases upholding a verdict after a long
lapse of time between sale and injury see Holifield v. Setco Indus. Inc., 42 Wis. 2d 750,
168 N.W.2d 177 (1969), Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
32. See Merchants v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d
749 (1949), for an example of South Carolina's use of circumstantial evidence in this
area.
33. PROSSER at 684.
34. Supra note 23 at 1114-15.
35. PROSSER at 684.
[Vol. 23
7
Tapp: Sections 2-725 and 2-318, of the Uniform Commercial Code--Their I
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
COMMENTS
necessity, do the illogical and cumbersome task of borrowing rules and
standards it feels appropriate. 6 But, the question is which rules and
standards to borrow? It necessarily follows that these ad hoc decisions
will, in some instances, cause confusion and even bewilderment to the
parties. Some of those decisions will include the proper measure of
damages, whether or not the action is one that survives, does immunity
exist, is recovery for wrongful death allowed, is the claim assignable,
what remedies are available, and which statute of limitation is to be
applied."7
The above problems are by no means exhaustive; consider further
the problem of deciding which defenses are to be utilized in a tort type
warranty action. In a given case should assumption of risk, or
contributory negligence, be a defense? The case of Guarino v. Mine
Safety Appliance Co.,-" points to yet another perplexity. In Guarino the
surviving plaintiffs and administrators of decedents' estates sued the
seller-manufacturer of an oxygen mask for wrongful death and injury
on the theory that breach of implied warranty can function as a basis
for the application of the "danger invites rescue" doctrine. The seller
had manufactured a defective oxygen producing mask which was
utilized by a co-worker of the plaintiffs39 while he was working in the
New York sewer system. During work, the mask malfunctioned and a
plaintiff co-worker removed his mask to summon aid; other plaintiff
co-workers paid heed to the call and entered the sewer, without masks,
to assist. As a result of the rescue effort three plaintiffs were killed and
the others were seriously injured due to the presence of poisonous gases
permeating the sewer complex. The trial court held for all the plaintiffs
upon the theory presented, and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed while noting that the rescue doctrine traditionally applied to
negligence actions. But, in a case where one person's wrongful act,
whether characterised as negligent or breach of implied. warranty,
causes another's life to be placed in peril, and as a result thereof, rescue
efforts are undertaken, then the doctrine should be applied.
36. Id.
37. Supra note 23 at 1126, see also PROSSER at 684.
38. 25 N.Y.2d 460,255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
39. The estate of the victim with the malfunctioning mask recovered against the
seller in Rooney v. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383,281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967);
the Guarino court held the seller bound by the trial court finding in Rooney, that there
was a breach of implied warranty.
19711
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It is important to note that Guarino did apply the rescue doctrine
to a contract action,40 and that liability for breach of implied warranty
was extended to a non-user of the product who was not directly injured
by the defective product. It is fortunate for the plaintiffs that the New
York court arrived at what appears to be a fair solution. One wonders
how many other courts would have been able to unshackle themselves
from the confines of contract law; one wonders further whether or not
there is a need for courts to face such problems as those caused by the
forced interaction of contract and tort prinicples.
Separation of tort and contract actions would give adequate notice
to plaintiffs and defendants as to the applicable rules and standards
that would govern their actions; and, therefore, there would not be a
need to await a strained, but appropriate, application of a doctrine,
rule, standard, or procedure. It is submitted that the trial court is
neither designed for, nor suited to making decisions which greater
legislative foresight would have avoided.
South Carolina's variations from the uniform model of the
U.C.C. have resulted in expanding the plaintiff's power under the code
provisions. 41 The policy itself, to offer more protection to consumers, is
laudable. What is questioned is the means chosen to achieve that end;
that is, alteration of a contract limitation period and use of an often
fictitious theory such as the. third party beneficiary, does not resolve
many problems that will inevitably arise due to the hybrid nature of a
warranty action. The above problem is somewhat mitigated if no
legislative intent is presumed with reference to remedies available.
Does the code, in fact, express the intent that Article II shall be the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy when its provisions concerning the sale of
goods can be applied? At least one court has indicated that such intent
was to be found. In Mendel v. Pittsburg Plateglass Co.,4 2 the New York
Court of Appeals decided an action brought on the theories of
negligence, strict tort liability, and breach of implied warranty. At the
time of the accident the contract limitations period was six years43 and
40. Mendel v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), established that breach of implied warranty was a contract action.
4 1. This expansion was caused by § § 2-725 and 2-318.
42. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
43. N.Y.Civ. PRAC. § 213 (McKinney 1963).
[Vol. 23
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the code was not yet in effect." The court indicated, however, that the
code would control a similar accident since its effective date, and that
the legislature, through sections 2-725 and 2-318, had expressed an
intention to have the code provisions applied exclusively to the
U.C.C.'s area of law. As a result of this interpretation the court
rejected any implication that after Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp.," strict liability in tort existed in New York. That decision
reduced plaintiff's theories by one, and as it turned out, plaintiff
finished the day with but one theory, that of negligence. It seems that
the applicable six year statute on contracts, which applied to the breach
of warranty action, had commenced to run on rhe sale of the
product-here, a plateglass door. As the accident occurred more than
six years after sale, the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the
limitations period, even before the injury, and thus the accrual of the
cause of action. Although a case such as Mendel could not occur in
South Carolina due to the design of section 2-725, it does serve to
illustrate a court's sensitivity to legislative intent, whether actual or
implied.
It is urged that the Uniform Commercial Code itself is not
sufficient to accomplish the desiderata; however, the legislature has
attempted to protect the consumer and third parties by changes in
sections 2-725 and 2-318. Such would seem to indicate sensitivity to a
problem rather than any desire to impede or stunt the growth of outside
law in a related area. Indeed, the South Carolina courts have become
sensitive to the needs of the consumer.
In Salladin v. Tellis Pharmacy,46 the South Carolina Supeme
Court adopted the rule set out in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.4"
Later, in Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co.,"8 the state
supreme court refused to sustain a demurrer to an action based on
breach of implied warranty where no privity was existing between
plaintiff and defendant. The Springfield opinion cited section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which had not yet become effective,
and said "[I]t is cited only to show recognition by the legislature of the
44. The Code's effective date in New York was September 27, 1964, McKINNEY'S
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 1-101 to 10-105.
45. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
46. 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
47. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
48. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
1971]
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need for departure from a strict rule of privity in products liability
cases." 49 In 1968, Rogers v. Scyphers1' was decided by the supreme
court. Rogers held that a builder-vendor of a new house is liable to the
purchaser or his invitees for injuries sustained, if the builder-vendor
negligently or willfully fails to reveal dangerously defective
construction of which he has knowledge or should have knowledge in
the exercise of due care.
In June of 1968, Smith v. Regina Manufacturing Corp.' was
decided by the Fourth Circuit. In Smith, Sears Roebuck had put its
own label on a floor polisher manufactured by Regina; the lower court
held for the plaintiff against both parties in an action brought by Smith
due to personal injuries sustained because the floor polisher was
defective. No law on point existed in South Carolina at the time of the
decision. The federal court reasoned that section 2-31452 of the U.C.C.,
not effective at the date of injury, evidenced the state's willingness to
accept the rationale of section 400, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS;- thus, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
latest South Carolina case in the area is Rutledge v. Dodenhoff. 4
Rutledge involved the sale of a new house, by the builder-vendor, with a
faulty septic tank. The court held that in such a sale there was an
implied warranty of habitability and that the house was build in a
reasonably workmanlike manner. The cases above illustrate South
Carolina's recognition that law must meet the changing times.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this recognition will not be thwarted by the
variations in sections 2-725 and 2-318 of the U.C.C. It appears likely
that our changes from the uniform section could result in needless
confusion and some cases that are wrongly decided. Inasmuch as it is
unlikely that section 2-318 will be repealed, or that section 2-725 will be
made to conform with the uniform section, it is urged that the
development of the law, outside the code, should be encouraged. The
49. Id. at 137, 153 S.E.2d at 187.
50. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
51. 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-314 (Supp. 1966).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400, Comment M (1965).
54. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
[Vol. 23
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code remedy need not be exclusive, 5  and in cases where the code may
not be applicable, such as leases and services, 56 there is also a good
opportunity to develop sound law.5 7
RICHARD N. TAPP
55. In Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, (1962), California recognized that warranty actions arose not from the
sale, nor was it dependent upon the existence of any contract, but was imposed by law,
in tort, as a matter of public policy. Note also, that section 2-318 of the U.C.C. in
California was not considered.
56. It seems that the liability imposed by warranty is limited to iellers of goods; See
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-103 (l)(d), 10.2-106 (1), 10.2-313 (l)(a), 10.2-314(1), 10.2-
315; but cf. § 10.2-313, comment 2.
57. It is noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court in Springfield, supra note
48, at 136, recognized the trend toward adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 402 (A).
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